

The Hobbesian Bargain: State-Building, Fiscal Capacity, and Preferences for Redistribution in Fragile States

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Abstract

What explains citizens' preferences for redistribution in fragile states? This article examines fiscal capacity in the context of modern state-building in the developing world. Citizens in weak states face numerous barriers articulating redistributive demands to the state and confront non-state actors that provide alternative governance. We argue that as governments struggle to supply their end of a "Hobbesian bargain" by establishing political authority and legitimacy, citizens' experiences with formal state institutions importantly shapes demands of government. We hypothesize that individuals who perceive the state as the legitimate provider of rule and law and public services are more likely to support redistribution. Further, individuals who gain greater political inclusion in the new regime demonstrate less willingness for policy action, while forms of quasi-voluntary compliance and individuals' risk aversion mediate preferences. We test hypotheses using nation-wide novel survey data from Afghanistan, which provides a critical juncture to leverage variation in institutional quality and citizens' perceptions of the state. Tests and robustness checks provide supportive evidence for hypotheses, and contributions to theory and policy domains focused on the institutional components of state-building and economic development.

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1 Introduction

A country's institutions are central to state-building and laying the foundations for economic growth.¹ One critical institution involves the "fiscal constitution,"² or set of regulations regarding the government's desire to raise revenue from its population and, concomitantly, citizens' expectations of the government to enforce contracts, protect property rights, and provide public services.³ Strengthening fiscal arrangements forms a hallmark of the political development of many modern industrialized democracies, and may account for growth in developing countries that improve their governance and policy environments.⁴

But increasingly, the world's poor populate failed or failing states that lack the institutional endowments or reform capacity of other developing countries. Instead, fragile states are governed by emergent regimes that lack a monopoly on violence and consolidated political authority. These states are at worst characterized as Hobbesian nightmares or more soberly, as "fragile" states, "quasi-states," or areas of "limited statehood."⁵ Fragile states result from rapid and monumental political upheavals and violence that radically alter the nature of governance, degrade state infrastructure, and spark a re-configuration of institutions after state collapse.⁶ Citizens suffer from a lack of state infrastructure acutely and welfare indicators in fragile states significantly fall below those in the average developing country.⁷ But faced with limited sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy,⁸ nascent regimes emerging from collapse confront numerous challenges towards supplying state capacity to raise revenue and meet citizens' basic needs as "political institutions are non-cohesive and political instability is high [therefore] no incumbent invests in the fiscal powers of the state."⁹ Lacking a government that successfully provides fiscal arrangements at the same time as needing robust government action to meet basic needs, what, if any, fiscal demands do citizens make in fragile

¹Fukuyama 2014.

²Timmons 2005.

³North 1981.

⁴Burnside and Dollar 2000.

⁵Lake 2011.

⁶For example, such states have emerged in the twenty-first century from violent regime transitions associated with the "Arab Spring" (e.g., Yemen, Libya), in the context of direct foreign military intervention for regime change (e.g., the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan), and with post-conflict reconstruction and assistance after civil wars (e.g., internationally supported efforts in South Sudan, Sierra Leone, and East Timor).

⁷Blattman and Miguel 2010.

⁸Krasner and Weinstein 2014, Lake 2016.

⁹Besley and Persson 2011, 14.

states?

To investigate this question, we explore how the contours of modern state-building impact citizens' support for redistribution. Shocks to a country's institutions and the subsequent re-configuration of political authority and reconstruction of state infrastructure after collapse provides a "critical juncture" to examine whether and how uncertain and unstable order at initial, and still evolving, period of state-building shape the supply of, and demand for, the government's redistributive policies.¹⁰ In these efforts, we note that the inability of fragile states to provide fiscal contracts specifically underscores a fundamental paradox of governance and creating social order. While delivering strong fiscal foundations would serve the regime's forward-looking goals by gaining revenue and the population's compliance, its inability to provide the prerequisites for a fiscal bargain in the near-term often fails to meet people's demands for redistributive policies and leads the population to withhold signaling support for the government. Fragile states find themselves caught in a governance "trap" that exacerbates a development "trap":¹¹ to obtain compliance through redistribution, the government must first achieve authority and legitimacy but lacks the ability to do so effectively; to signal consent, the population must feel secure physically and economically, but lacks the necessary property rights and public services. Fragile states are therefore unlikely to become successful fiscal states unless they manage to solve this paradox.

Our theoretical motivation towards understanding how states and citizens might confront the governance-poverty nexus is framed by synthesizing well-known metaphors from political theory and political economy with studies on political behavior. Fundamentally, regimes and populations faced with trying to overcome the pernicious effects of governance and development traps face a Hobbesian dilemma. Weighing the costs and benefits of anarchy compared to a strong sovereign, Thomas Hobbes famously made the case that social actors are better-off forming a social contract with a state rather than suffer the effects of disorder. The context of the English Civil War in the 17th century is not unlike the myriad civil conflicts that mark failed states in the developing world today. While citizens do not (yet) have a *strong* sovereign to support over anarchy, they nonetheless face instability, uncertainty, and a lack of services at a moment when a nascent leviathan attempts

¹⁰Centeno et al. 2017.

¹¹Collier 2008.

state-building to establish order and command the population's devotion. Therefore, individuals in fragile states face a type of Hobbesian dilemma: do they attempt to survive in (or even benefit from) anarchy at the expense of joining a social order governed by a state (however weak);¹² or do they comply with the leviathan's authority and recognize its legitimacy by working to improve the social order to grow the state's fiscal capacity?

Prior approaches towards understanding how citizens in contemporary failed states navigate this Hobbesian decision point to forms of "exit," "voice," and "loyalty"¹³ as likely drivers of individuals' redistributive demands. Fundamentally, redistribution requires a government to supply some level of fiscal foundations (tax collection, property rights) without which welfare-improving economic and social policies are virtually impossible.¹⁴ At first glance, lacking the gains from revenue collection and sufficient service provision, citizens in weak states plausibly do not express *any* beliefs about a fiscal contract ("exit") provided by the government. Facing new and unfamiliar environments after state collapse, citizens may struggle to articulate preferences, align their economic interests with newly established political coalitions, or trust the credibility of politicians' promises.¹⁵ Citizens may further "exit" by turning to alternative non-state sources of governance that fill the government's void,¹⁶ including self-help,¹⁷ traditional authorities,¹⁸ civil society,¹⁹ international actors,²⁰ or insurgents.²¹ A lack of order may also leads many citizens to literally exit and flee to seek protection in neighboring states or regions. At the same time, most citizens' economic positions would lead them to accept an Hobbesian bargain. By recognizing the government's authority, individuals may express strong preferences *for* redistribution ("voice") since they would benefit from government-provided services that are more efficiently provided in a stable social order. Further,

¹²For example, Leeson 2007 examines the conditions under which people may be "better off stateless" using the case of Somalia, where development has improved under anarchy and in the absence of a predatory state.

¹³Hirschman 1970.

¹⁴This is separate from purely "distributive" demands arising from pre-tax allocations of wealth by the government resulting from total economic output. Redistribution refers to the post-tax allocation of income and resources from public expenditures on economic and social policies targeted to benefit specific sectors, households, or individuals (such as cash transfers to poor households or unemployment benefits (Aaron and McGuire 1970, Bradley et al. 2003)).

¹⁵Keefer 2007.

¹⁶Risse and Stollenwerk 2018.

¹⁷Miguel and Gugerty 2005.

¹⁸Baldwin 2015.

¹⁹Cammett and MacLean 2014.

²⁰Krasner and Risse 2014.

²¹Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011, Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013, Weinstein 2006.

social or economic groups with greater potential influence over policy-making in a nascent regime's institutional matrix may leverage bonds of political "loyalty" with those in power to sweeten the Hobbesian deal by limiting the pursuit of welfare-enhancing redistribution to their group.²² Forms of exit, voice, and loyalty all provide plausible, yet contrasting, predictions about the form and direction of citizens' redistributive demands in fragile states.

We examine individuals' redistributive preferences in Afghanistan, a unique and important case that also demonstrates many common challenges of state-building, weak institutional capacity, and fiscal contracting in the developing world. Despite the country's relatively strong state consolidation, territorial sovereignty, and political reforms up through the late 20th century, political shocks to its institutional environment and subsequent state collapse after decades of conflict provide the opportunity to study a critical fiscal juncture when Afghans and their fragile leviathan confront possible Hobbesian bargains. The newly constituted, and nominally democratic, government that worked to re-establish governance and critical institutions after the Taliban's ouster by the US invasion in 2001 has made important strides towards rebuilding basic institutions to project authority, regain territorial control, and establish legitimacy, including holding elections. However, Afghanistan's new government also suffers many pathologies of fragile state governance, including lacking a monopoly on violence amid ongoing insurgent attacks, poor property rights enforcement, low tax effort (except through extortion and bribery), and the inability to provide many needed public services that non-state rivals (including insurgents) increasingly offer. The inability of the Afghan state thus far to properly supply a strong fiscal constitution begs the Hobbesian dilemma for most Afghans, who confront viable options of exit, voice, and loyalty. What redistributive expectations do Afghans express of their government, if any, and what are the conditions under which they favor more or less policy action to increase government-provided welfare?

We argue that in fragile states working to gain citizens' compliance but before fiscal contracting is complete, individuals' experience with the state and their perceptions of the legitimacy of government institutions importantly influences their redistributive preferences.²³ A government must

²²Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.

²³We follow Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009, 356 and define legitimacy as "a sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities (value-based legitimacy) that then translates into actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws (behavioral legitimacy)."

show that it can, at a minimum, demonstrate its authority, or “rightful rule,”²⁴ by providing institutional procedures, rule of law, and services that citizens consider fair and productive. The more the state establishes such institutions and performs well in their functioning, the more citizens will comply with, and submit to, the leviathan’s authority and avoid “exit” by either seeking refuge in different territories or governance from non-state actors. Citizens accepting the Hobbesian bargain do so to improve the social order generally, which includes support for critical institutions to reap the gains from the state’s ability pursue redistributive policies. Importantly, we argue that legitimacy and compliance are key towards shaping citizens’ redistributive expectations even *before* (or as) the state achieves fiscal capacity or successfully addresses citizens’ basic economic needs.²⁵ We hypothesize that citizens who positively perceive state institutions as legitimate are more likely to support government action to redistribute revenue; conversely, individuals that do not view the state as legitimate, or turn to alternative non-state sources of governance, are less likely to favor redistribution.

Next, we argue that citizens’ degree of political inclusion and differential access to state resources in fragile settings will further shape their redistributive beliefs if they accept the Hobbesian bargain. Although fragile states generally fail to perform on providing fiscal capacity writ large, politicians’ logic of political survival will necessitate devoting redistribution to their coalitions. But rather than allocate resources based on policy stability to achieve long-run economic potential, politicians will gear redistributive policies towards supporters to maintain survival conditional on a budget constraint that forces a stark trade-off between broad programmatic policies and targeted club goods.²⁶ The reconfiguration of political power *after* state collapse often looks very different than the lines of distributional logic before the emergence of the new leviathan.²⁷ As a result, citizens’ expectations of what their group might receive from greater redistribution under the new regime will importantly shape their demands according to their access to state resources. A person does

²⁴Lake 2011.

²⁵This argument echoes Hobbes’ formulation of the social contract, which is at once a voluntary act of self-interest and a binding obligation to comply with the state, but without the guaranteed benefit that motivates the “contract” in the first instance.

²⁶Geddes 1994.

²⁷For example, while ethnic Sunnis were promoted under Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime in Iraq, after the US invasion, the majority Shiites have worked with Kurdish allies to exclude Sunnis, accounting for the growth of the Sunni insurgency against the current government.

not just desire “a” leviathan, but “their” leviathan. We argue that citizens’ projections of who will represent their interests today in a fragile state’s newly democratic government are formed in the transitional stage not by strong parties with a history of demonstrated performance but by whether they share pre-democratic loyalties with political actors who are powerful enough to gain influence in an emergent leviathan’s governing coalition. If individuals share bonds of loyalties with those in power, we hypothesize that they will leverage that inclusion to limit the government’s broad redistributive resources to differentially reap the benefits of government access to themselves and their group. Citizens who lack direct access or otherwise perceive corrupt practices in how state funds are spent by politicians are more likely to reject a loyalty system and favor of broader redistribution to “spread the wealth around.”

Importantly, our first two sets of hypotheses do not arise from redistributive demands derived after a fragile state’s demonstrated success supplying security, property rights, taxation, or services. By setting our study in a fragile state *before* the government has successfully supplied its end of the fiscal bargain, our approach advances the idea that redistributive demand is not purely a function of citizens’ expectations from having paid the government taxes and expecting services in return per fiscal theories, nor is it only a function of citizens’ needs to receive greater government services to alleviate perilous economic conditions. Rather, we suggest that those who accept the Hobbesian bargain and grant the state’s authority are more likely to favor redistribution (narrowly) when the state succeeds at providing institutional procedures and outcomes (broadly) that the population views as legitimate. Moreover, individuals who believe they will enjoy stronger access to the state in the newly democratizing regime will want to limit government’s direction of resources, while citizens who feel more excluded will want to prevent the misuses of funds spent by the government and favor a more active role to build a strong social order.

To further interrogate the applicability of our logic to a nascent regime’s fiscal *potential*, we investigate the conditions under which citizens’ preferences change to favor greater redistribution if the leviathan demonstrates that it can deliver on fair fiscal bargain. First, we argue that variation in a form of what Levi (1989) terms “quasi-voluntary compliance” serves to mediate preferences but only if a fragile leviathan demonstrates a revenue-to-services transfer capacity. Quasi-voluntary compliance arises when the state provides enough coercive capacity to threaten enforcement should

citizens fail to comply with taxation, but does not require the leviathan to consistently or directly enforce payment in every instance. As a leviathan gains control, citizens grow to trust that others are paying “their fair share” and a self-reinforcing equilibrium arises where citizens mobilize for collective action to pay taxes and receive services in return. Whether and how quasi-voluntary compliance arises in a weak state setting is considerably less clear since citizens reasonably doubt the government’s enforcement ability and inhabit conflict-affected communities with variable bonds of social solidarity necessary for collection action. But by incorporating the logic of quasi-voluntary compliance into our theoretical framework, we predict that citizens will express greater support for redistribution with a fair fiscal bargain upheld by a fragile government (demonstrated by a revenue-to-services transfer) irrespective of citizens’ views on taxation generally. Therefore, a form of quasi-voluntary compliance may therefore arise even if a government lacks robust enforcement or citizens have problems trusting others’ contributions.

Second, we argue that redistributive preferences in fragile states are also likely mediated by how citizens discount the future given prior violence exposure and ongoing instability. Violence affects individuals’ perceptions of risk and investment.²⁸ Uncertainty drives individuals to discount the future and favor present consumption, such as their willingness to pay taxes today in expectation of receiving services tomorrow. In fragile states suffering economic uncertainty, we hypothesize that citizens who are accepting of greater risk are more likely to favor redistribution whereas individuals who are risk averse are less likely to favor redistribution.

Perceptual data of citizens’ views of the state and redistributive beliefs can only be gained by asking them, so we leverage variation in institutional quality and action reflected in citizens’ perceptions of, and contact with, the Afghan state by employing original individual-level survey data collected across all regions of the country before the 2010 parliamentary elections. Two important features of our research design and data afford unique opportunities to test predictions. First, conducting our empirical exercise in Afghanistan generates an unprecedented ability to examine the early stages of state-building after state collapse and during contemporaneous attempts by an emergent leviathan to establish political authority that also competes for governance against non-state actors. The case meets the theoretical scope conditions outlined by citizens’ demands reflecting

²⁸Callen et al. 2014.

exit, voice, and loyalty. Second, we exploit unique features of the survey’s timing (a few weeks before the country’s second parliamentary election) mapped onto aspects of electoral institutions to develop a plausibly exogenous source of variation in state access based on respondents’ direct familial relations with sitting members of parliament (20% of our sample) to better isolate the effects of perceptions of a state’s “supply” of fiscal capacity resulting from political inclusion from either endogenously determined views of state legitimacy formed in the pre-democratic era or as shaped by politicians’ attempts to recalibrate clientelist commitments to meet voters’ redistribute demands after the introduction of competitive elections. Such a likelihood of winning re-election would be at least in part driven by citizens’ perception of government performance beyond shared familial relationships of politicians. But clan (*qawm*) membership determined at birth and shared with political actors determined *before* the new regime was established helps isolate individuals’ likely access to state resources and perceptions of a nascent democratic regime’s legitimacy that only vests *after* those actors become newly elected officials (capable of gaining seats in the first parliamentary election in 2005) but also *before* those actors and new ones compete in the second election (2010) when citizens’ perceptions of access may be driven by the performance of elected politicians who have served for the last five years.

Previewing results, 57% of respondents express favor in the direction of more redistribution compared to 43% who favor less, despite the great need for more robust government action to support the population’s welfare in Afghanistan. Interrogating this variation, we first find that individuals’ beliefs about the government’s authority and legitimacy importantly conditions Afghans’ redistributive preferences. Citizens demonstrating compliance with rule of law by sharing information on insurgent activity were between nine and 11 points more likely to support government intervention in helping the poor; and individuals attributing just adjudication of legal disputes and the provision of public services to a government body were 12 and six percentage points more likely to favor redistribution compared to those who turn to non-state sources. Respondents who report more consistent government-provided services, measured by electricity access, are positively (but weakly) disposed to more redistribution. Second, respondents with a relative sitting in parliament were nine points less likely to favor redistribution, while individuals who perceive corruption in politicians’ use of funds to provide services are between four and five points more likely to favor

greater redistribution. Third, individual's demonstrating beliefs in the importance of paying taxes to the government without any mention of how that revenue will be spent are about six points less likely to favor redistribution, but those who express quasi-voluntary compliance after learning that the government will use tax revenue in exchange for better services are seven points more likely to say that the state should intervene on behalf of the poor. Moreover, a one unit increase in willingness to take risks corresponds to a one percent increase towards pro-redistribution. Last, while observational data do not allow us to completely rule out all spurious factors that may confound our statistical tests, we address numerous threats to inference summarized in the main text and explored further in the Appendix. Our findings remain robust to a number of alternative specifications that account for different modeling assumptions, individual-level factors and local conditions likely to drive preferences, selection effects, and possible measurement bias.

We believe our findings make important contributions to understanding the political economy of fiscal capacity and state-building in conflict-prone fragile states. We address the paradox of governance and development in weak states made apparent by two distinct bodies of scholarship that highlight the critical role of establishing and consolidating state institutions capable of laying the foundations for economic growth. However, they beg, rather than resolve, the governance paradox at the center of growing fiscal capacity in fragile states.

First, research on the political economy of development has long identified the importance of fiscal capacity as a critical component of building the state's authority, legitimacy, and ability to induce compliance. But in arguing for the necessity of a fiscal constitution for long-run economic performance, political economists tend to either focus on endogenous institutional change of states that "got it right"²⁹ or exploit variation in historical institutional type or quality to explain development outcomes today.³⁰ Yet many modern developing states confront having to establish fiscal constitutions and meet redistributive demands in the first instance and after significant and potentially unanticipated institutional shocks (often either directly from outside actors or inspired by outside events) and reformulates the contours of the political bargain between leviathan and citizen. This provides a variety of new plausible paths for reform in the short or long-term that

²⁹Kiser and Barzel 1991.

³⁰Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001.

may work differently or similarly from endogenous institutional changes or historically determined institutional endowments examined by this research. We point to the need to pay more attention to specifically fragile and failing states and the institutional components of development challenges in the first instance of state-building that confront most of the world's poor today.

In contrast, a second, emerging body of international relations (IR) scholarship increasingly focuses specifically on state-building in fragile or failed states. Because these states typically arise from shocks created by international dynamics; provide important implications for regional or global security; or involve internationally-provided military, diplomatic, and financial assistance; IR scholars appropriately reflect on international efforts to bolster nascent regimes after state collapse. This research has identified the importance of re-establishing governance and rule of law to consolidate the state's authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy as a means to improve security, fight insurgency, and achieve stability. While recognizing that state-building creates new opportunities for studying the empirical components of post-conflict reconstruction, these studies often ignore the importance of fiscal contracting specifically and the sources of revenue-generation needed to achieve those goals. Because post-conflict reconstruction gains from international or bilateral support, these studies often also frequently fail to balance the effects of external support for institutional capacity on domestic dynamics. Fiscal reform and economic growth more often than not obtains from domestic sources of revenue and requires endogenous institutional changes over a long period (even when exogenous shocks to budgets can increase revenue in the short-term). But because fundamental non-fiscal institutions, such as security provision, contribute to fiscal foundations and vice versa, when and how fiscal bargains fit into broader institutional sequencing during state-building has thus far lacked theoretical and empirical attention.

Our study builds on and contributes to the core insights of these literatures. We show that whether and how an emergent leviathan negotiates the contours of state reconstruction may work to compound, resolve, or completely mis-identify citizens' redistributive demands, which lay at the heart of the Hobbesian bargain. States and social actors must work together together to establish social order and resolve the governance-poverty nexus. Even before (or as) incipient states lack complete political authority and the ability to effectively provide components necessary for a fiscal contract, citizens may still comply with a leviathan's authority and work to improve fiscal

governance and service provision as long as the government supplies institutions that are deemed legitimate and perform well in the eyes of the population, including fair judicial procedures, rule of law, and basic infrastructure. This may occur even before a history of redistribute policies and strong tax capacity. For political economy research, we show that the fiscal foundations need not always arise from endogenous reform or exogenous historical shocks – states can do things in the short-term to build fiscal foundations. For IR scholarship, we highlight the important domestic locus of institutions, sources of revenue, and direct policy actions by the state towards state-building, and the importance of fiscal institutions to support, and be supported by, other state-building efforts like inclusive government and counter-insurgency. Even if external aid positively impacts some institutional strengthening or directly influences how citizens view the regime in the short-term, fragile states and their citizens must directly confront Hobbesian bargains first and foremost if a state is to grow fiscal capacity and achieve economic development.

Studying the effects of rapid shocks on institutional change in fragile states is not just a theoretical concern, nor is it confined to Afghanistan. Our results also provide important, but cautionary, insights for policy. In the developing world, “violent conflict has spiked dramatically since 2010,” and fragile states increasingly encompass much of the world’s developing country population.³¹ The World Bank estimates that as of 2018, 2 billion people live in developing countries marked by “fragility, conflict, and violence,” and that the share of the global poor living in fragile countries will rise more than 60% by 2030. Increasingly, “both low- and middle-income countries are affected by fragility risks, some far away from where the problems start” (World Bank 2018), demonstrated by how failed states increasingly create humanitarian crises and policy problems in industrialized countries given refugee and migrant flows from collapsed states in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Donors and international organizations have devoted significant resources to bolster newly-formed governments’ attempts to establish peace, the competent delivery of basic services to their citizens, and expand institutional inclusiveness through elections,³² but such “post-conflict” reconstruction efforts involving large amounts of aid and democracy promotion—including in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, East Timor, and South Sudan – have yielded mixed, and often

³¹Blattman and Miguel 2010.

³²Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2013.

negative, results.³³

Reconstructing critical institutions after periods of conflict—and during a contemporaneous implementation of democracy under foreign support—may unintentionally serve to reinforce, rather than solve, the paradox of governance in fragile states. First, access to international sources of revenue may have perverse effects that allow new government elites to disregard local domestic revenue. Second, where donors commit significant assistance to support elections and inclusive government,³⁴ especially as an important mechanism for state-building and conflict mitigation, democracy promotion efforts are often ineffective³⁵ as competitive elections under conditions of state fragility often leads to the resumption of violence and electoral corruption. For example, without considering security costs, the international community spent over \$250 million to administer Afghanistan’s 2010 election, \$147 million on the 2014 election, and parliamentary and presidential elections slated for 2018-19 are each projected to cost at least \$210 million.³⁶ Yet electoral violence from insurgents has increasingly threatened voter safety and reduced turnout,³⁷ and electoral corruption perennially undermines the integrity of races³⁸ and erodes citizens’ views of the government’s legitimacy³⁹ and willingness to demonstrate compliance.⁴⁰ While our results do not suggest that the international community should necessarily disengage from support for state-building in fragile states like Afghanistan, it does underscore the importance of leveraging evaluations of state-building policies and whether they are effective at building institutions deemed legitimate by the population for the government to gain domestic support to prevent possible future exit by Afghans, many of whom thus far have exercised voice and loyalty to the new leviathan to improve the social order but may decide soon it is in their interest to renege on the Hobbesian bargain.

³³Findley 2018, Lake and Fariss 2014.

³⁴Fearon 2011, Hyde 2011.

³⁵Kelley 2012

³⁶Adili 2017. The US had spent \$71 billion on efforts to reconstruct Afghan security forces by 2017 (SIGAR 2017), including tens of millions of dollars specifically for election security.

³⁷Condra et al. 2017.

³⁸Callen and Long 2015.

³⁹Berman et al. 2018.

⁴⁰Condra et al. 2018.

2 Theoretical Motivation

States require revenue to operate. But for the state to have any revenue to collect, the population has to be able to engage in economic activity without fear of violence or expropriation. The government in turn must spend funds to provide public goods, including security, property rights, and services (such as schools and electricity) to support citizens' livelihoods. While from whom and by how much the state extracts revenue is a matter of strategic calculation to secure political survival, robust fiscal arrangements contribute to development when they constrain the leviathan's desire for expropriation,⁴¹ solidify domestic order,⁴² and allow inclusive representation of diverse economic and social actors.⁴³ Scholars have accordingly noted the central role of fiscal contracting historically for state consolidation and economic expansion in Europe,⁴⁴ China,⁴⁵ and Latin America.⁴⁶ Research has also identified challenges to growth in developing countries that lack complete fiscal bargains.⁴⁷ "Supply-side" barriers arising from a lack of state capacity and poor governance, including challenges of tax compliance,⁴⁸ corruption,⁴⁹ and rent-seeking⁵⁰ may all hinder development.

Because a country's institutions affect the prospects for long-run economic performance mediated through fiscal arrangements, research has focused attention on the conditions under which a state grows fiscal capacity. First, countries may supply fiscal components from endogenous institutional change when the relative political bargaining power of economic or social actors effectively forces policy concessions from the leviathan,⁵¹ including how institutions absorb the impact of economic shocks, such as the discovery of natural resources, that generate new forms of revenue and spending for the state.⁵² Second, variation in a country's institutional endowments, such as those determined

⁴¹Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994, North and Weingast 1989.

⁴²Olson 1993.

⁴³Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001.

⁴⁴Tilly 1993.

⁴⁵Wong 1997.

⁴⁶Centeno 1997.

⁴⁷Dincecco 2011.

⁴⁸Besley and Persson 2011.

⁴⁹Besley and Persson 2009.

⁵⁰North, Wallis and Weingast 2009.

⁵¹Kiser and Barzel 1991, Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell 2012.

⁵²Per Demsetz 1968, "property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization" (350). A regime may also adopt ideological underpinnings that necessitate broad redistribution as a component of a "developmental" state (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, Schneider 2014), a

historically by patterns of colonization, may shape type and quality of long-term governance and economic performance.⁵³

While these conditions have been applied to understand the historical emergence of states per fiscal theories or as presented to explain historically-determined institutional endowments and endogenous change to explain economic growth today, our focus extends these insights to examines state-building and regime consolidation to fragile states today following significant “shocks” to a country’s institutional environment.⁵⁴ The prospects for fiscal capacity in fragile states following institutional disruptions may be affected by changes in political authority and attending economic disturbances after periods of state collapse. Unlike in other developing contexts that face economic challenges but nonetheless enjoy consolidated state institutions, we relax Weberian assumptions that a leviathan has established and solidified political authority,⁵⁵ monopolized violence, or retained the capacity to systematically tax and provide services. Numerous impediments curtail fragile states’ ability to write and uphold a fiscal contract. Political actors (frequently with outside support) must rebuild institutions even where the state’s authority, legitimacy, and institutional capacity are weak. In conflict-prone environments, the emergent leviathan often competes to govern and gain territorial control against non-state actors.⁵⁶ Consequently, civilians may comply with alternative governance and signal obedience if those political actors are more capable of providing needed services than the government.⁵⁷ Problematically and paradoxically, fragile states face the task of building fiscal capacity before they are strong enough to do so, while at the same time their citizens may express redistributive demands that the government appears unwilling or unable to address.

condition we do not focus on in this paper given that this rarely applies to fragile states today.

⁵³Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Engerman and Sokoloff 1997.

⁵⁴Our investigation is therefore somewhat distinct from studies that examine purely economic shocks from natural resources or international aid to government coffers and institutional quality in developing countries (Brautigam and Knack 2004).

⁵⁵Following Lake (2011), we conceive of political authority as “...Rightful or legitimate rule” (17). “When political authority is exercised, the ruler, A, commands a set of subordinates, B, to alter their actions, where command implies that A has the *right* to issue such orders. This right, in turn, implies a correlative obligation or *duty* by B to comply, if possible, with A’s order” (17-18), but “Authority and, specifically, the right to punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler’s right to rule”(18).

⁵⁶Bakke et al. 2014.

⁵⁷Alternative sources of governance could reside locally with communal self-help and solidarity; local traditional, religious, or ethnic leaders; non-governmental or aid agencies. To effectively govern, the government must gain the population’s compliance and win the battle for “hearts and minds” against non-state elements (Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011). In the modern period, and relevant to the case of Afghanistan, growing studies document the aspects of rebels’ governance and inclusion of civilian populations which crucially involves both taxing civilians to support insurgents’ aims and proving services in return (Shapiro 2013, Weinstein 2006).

Prior theoretical and empirical literature highlights two instruments viewed as critical to post-conflict reconstruction that potentially compound this paradox, if unintentionally. First, developmental strategies generally advocate international aid and external assistance to bolster nascent regimes and provide budgetary support to help governments achieve short-term fiscal stability. However noble, this policy may induce domestic governments to rely overwhelmingly on financial support received from abroad rather than leverage local sources of revenue that requires long-term investments in fiscal capacity. But fiscal bargains forged through *domestic* sources of supply and demand are much more likely to strengthen linkages between leviathan and citizen.⁵⁸

Second, international partners press fragile states to hold competitive elections as a means of strengthening the regime's legitimacy and citizens' compliance through inclusive government,⁵⁹ which can help to improve fiscal governance by increasing the contribution of diverse economic and social interests towards policy formation and implementation. But the pressures of political competition brought about by democratic elections in fragile states after shocks to institutional environments often serve to further, rather than solve, the governance paradox. Unstable political or policy environments can compound the regime's governance by making it too weak to actually enforce fiscal promises but vulnerable to the loss of political office for not meeting citizens' demands in contrast to states supplying fiscal contracts in strictly authoritarian or consolidated democratic regimes. For example, a firmly ensconced authoritarian leader can unilaterally deploy resources in ways that maximize the likelihood of the regime's political survival balanced against its levels of rent-seeking. While the authoritarian's actions may prove either stable⁶⁰ or unstable,⁶¹ the regime's behavior is not brought about by having to bolster inclusive institutions. Moreover, in consolidated democracies, expectations derive from how the ruling coalition forms policy given how citizens organize politically to express policy desires, especially where economic class drives political selection. But in the political development of industrialized states, the bureaucratic state established Weberian elements *before* democratic features, such that state capacity was robust enough for broad programmatic policy action regarding fiscal components and redistribution. Variation in support

⁵⁸Bates and Lien 1985.

⁵⁹Norris 2014.

⁶⁰Gandhi 2008, Slater 2010.

⁶¹Haggard and Kaufman 2016.

for redistribution therefore arises less from problems of institutional supply and more from how policy preferences may onto political selection and how democratically elected politicians perform in policy implementation.⁶²

Citizen demands in democratizing fragile states are not as straightforwardly absorbed, ignored, or otherwise influenced by the institutional factors that transpose the population's preferences into policy outcomes compared to authoritarian or consolidated democracies. At first glance, citizens' economic and social position would plausibly lead them to express strong preferences for government action in fragile states because they are poor and would benefit from better services. Having accepted the Hobbesian bargain, social order benefits from citizens who work to improve the leviathan's behavior through compliance (paying taxes, voting). However, a poorly functioning state could curtail people's experience with redistribution and therefore limit their willingness to pay taxes to the government or expect to receive government service provision. Poor citizens or those that otherwise doubt the government's capacity may not want to transfer their income to the state for redistribution at all, or only under very specific conditions where they are guaranteed to benefit from preferential access to rents.⁶³ Further, electoral competition in conflict-prone societies may re-ignite or solidify sectarian divisions,⁶⁴ undermining demands for redistribution and public goods contributions that require trust or social capital.⁶⁵ Without credible institutional constraints on a fragile leviathan, citizens have little reason to perceive taxation as fair if the state is corrupt,⁶⁶ gains revenue through extortionary actions or bribery, operates at the behest of international actors,⁶⁷ or where the physical or social borders of a state are fluid and contested (e.g., Iraq/Syria,

⁶²The Meltzer and Richard 1981 model suggests a positive relationship between a person's income relative to the distribution of income and their support for public goods and redistributive policies in democracies with political parties that reflect economic preferences; less wealthy citizens below the median income hold stronger preferences in support of pro-poor government intervention compared to wealthier individuals above the median (Ansell and Samuels 2010, Boix 2001). Because developing countries have income that is hard to tax and household wealth held in assets rather than income, scholars note that other individual-level economic variables that conceptually correlate with income may make an individual's relative economic position in society salient to understand their redistributive preferences, including occupation (Haggard, Kaufman and Long 2013), basic needs (Dion and Birchfield 2010), and urban residence (Bates 1981).

⁶³Alesina and Giuliano 2009, Robinson and Verdier 2013. Ethnic fractionalization in developing countries can impede efforts required for coordinated public policies (Habyarimana et al. 2007), particularly if elected leaders distribute resources in biased ways to appeal to co-ethnics (Wantchekon 2003).

⁶⁴Horowitz 1985.

⁶⁵Rothstein 2005.

⁶⁶North, Wallis and Weingast 2009.

⁶⁷Lake 2016.

Afghanistan/Pakistan). With viable (if not dangerous) exit options escaping living in a fragile state or turning to alternative sources of services provided by non-state actors, citizens may suppress their demands of the state simply because they reject the Hobbesian bargain.

The institutional features of fragile countries suggest that the provision of a fiscal bargain, and consequently the demands for redistribution, beg a paradox of governance in fragile states. The institutional factors inherent to the governance-poverty nexus create numerous dilemmas for understanding citizens' preferences since demand is confounded by the same factors that prevent supply and could cause individuals—most of whom are poor and would otherwise benefit from redistribution—to either increase their demands of redistribution, limit them, or turn to other sources and forego the state entirely.

3 The Fiscal Contract and Redistributive Preferences in Fragile States

Our theoretical framework builds on previous approaches by focusing on redistribution as the outcome of revenue generation and spending policies pursued by a government that is working to gain compliance among individuals and economic actors in society but faces many challenges in the first moments of state-building. While fiscal theories typically highlight the importance of taxation as the government's source of revenue that drives citizens' expectations, in weak states significant portions of the government's budget may come from international aid or outside capital given a lack of local fiscal capacity, or simply be lacking from a state's nearly empty coffers. Taxes may also be limited to only those who work in the formal economy, or be perceived as extortionary by the population. Accordingly, to establish and uphold a fiscal contract, fragile states face an important strategic dilemma regarding the institutions they seek to build and the population they seek to rule: to gain compliance, governments must first establish fair procedures to foster the public's trust in state institutions,⁶⁸ and also perform in the execution of these institutions like granting and enforcing property rights, providing public services,⁶⁹ and building other "implementing institutions" directly

⁶⁸Levi and Sacks 2009.

⁶⁹Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000.

tied to policy enactment and outcomes.⁷⁰ But how do weak states gain compliance when they first need to build fiscal capacity, yet lack the fiscal capacity necessary to convince the population it is competent and capable of abiding by the fiscal contract?

To understand whether and how the nature of the state's institutional supply subsequently shapes redistributive demands in fragile states, we argue that before citizens will agree to uphold their end of a fiscal bargain, they must recognize the leviathan's authority and view the state as a potential, and rightful, provider of social welfare.⁷¹ Citizens in developing states mired in conflict must constantly navigate the uncertain choice between disorder, a fledgling sovereign, or non-state institutions. But to gain citizens' compliance, inchoate governments must at least begin to build institutions that start to provide order and strengthen state capacity if they want to grow their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Legitimacy is not a unidimensional concept; we highlight two important components. First, citizens' perceptions of procedural fairness on the part of governing institutions and rule of law shapes views of the state's *procedural legitimacy*.⁷² Second, citizens may view *performance legitimacy* based on their assessment of institutional outcomes, such as public service delivery and overall economic performance.⁷³

Citizens are more likely to support a more active role for the government in the redistribution of resources if the state demonstrate the sort of procedures and institutions necessary for rule of law and the delivery of public goods.⁷⁴ In weak states, there can be considerable variation in whether and how citizens experience the state's procedural and performance legitimacy based on the government's political control and effectiveness, which we argue subsequently shapes individuals' expression of demands over economic and social policy. On the one hand, given the highly uneven distribution of state capabilities and access to basic services, citizens who question whether they can trust that procedures and outcomes will occur equitably or effectively will dampen their demands for the basic redistributive capacity necessary for a state to become fiscally viable. On the other hand, and despite weak revenue collection, citizens are more likely to support the state's redistributive

⁷⁰Rothstein 2005.

⁷¹Hobbes posits a social contract that is more of a "covenant" in which the subject renounces the right to withhold duty out of trust that a sovereign will provide the benefits of the social contract (Rhodes).

⁷²Tyler 2006.

⁷³Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005, Scott and van de Walle 2009.

⁷⁴Bernstein and Lü 2003.

actions if they perceive that other basic formal institutions and actors are demonstrating competence and effectiveness. Even in poor countries with little history of robust policy action and taxation, we argue that citizens that have positive interactions with formal institutions and perceive the state as legitimate will vocalize demands for redistribution capacity because they believe that the state is working towards building fiscal foundations. Alternatively, individuals who do not view the government as legitimate could “exit” by relying on non-state actors, like traditional authorities or insurgents, simply fail to ask the government for anything, or migrate out of the state’s territory. State supply of fiscal capacity and citizens’ compliance with the state’s “rightful rule” forms an iterative process in the Hobbesian bargain: as states establish fair procedures and increasingly generate positive outcomes over time, the population is more likely to view the government as legitimate and signal their consent.

Insights on legitimacy produce observable implications for understanding how the interaction between the state and citizens at the early stages of state-building shapes citizens’ preferences for redistribution. We first hypothesize that *citizens who positively perceive state institutions as legitimate are more likely to support government action to redistribute revenue; conversely, individuals that do not perceive state institutions as legitimate, or turn to alternative non-state sources of governance for public goods are less likely to favor redistribution (H1).*

The skirting of fiscal capacity in fragile democracies could arise as much from the simple inability of leaders to be effective in taxation and spending as from their rent-seeking and authoritarian tendencies trying ensure political survival with limited state resources and in the unstable shadow of possible electoral defeat. We therefore second argue that because not all individuals will suffer from a poorly constituted or under-performing leviathan’s fiscal supply equally, groups that gain political inclusion and benefit from differential access to state resources will leverage state weakness precisely to their advantage to maximize the gains they receive from government rents, understood here as redistribution. Nascent states in particular are especially vulnerable to coalitions that seek to gain power and monopolize political competition for fiscal control and preferential access during transitional elections to consume state largesse in the short-term but also set new clientelist patterns.⁷⁵ As a result, variation in demand for redistribution will also be explained by the degree

⁷⁵For these reasons, it is not surprising that many fragile democracies—if they do not result in authoritarian

to which individuals and groups perceive themselves as included or excluded from state access in the new regime. Citizens with strong links to political powerful leaders will wish to limit the state's broad redistributive potential and instead limit consumption to themselves or their groups. Such coalitions may use the opening of democratic space and expanded political inclusion to further narrow constituency aims. We therefore hypothesize that *the more that citizens benefit from political inclusion from bonds of loyalty provided by access to powerful political actors, the less likely they are to support redistribution; conversely, citizens who lack strong linkages to members of the government or otherwise perceive corruption on the part of elected leaders in the provision of state resources are more likely to reject a loyalty system and favor government action to "spread the wealth around"* (H2).

By setting our study in fragile states *before* (or as) the state has successfully supplied its end of the fiscal bargain, our approach advances the idea that demand preferences are in part driven by perceptions of, and experiences with, variation in perceptions of state institutions. Preferences are not purely a function of citizens' redistributive demands derived from a state's success supplying security, property rights, taxation, or service provision; nor is it only a function of citizens' economic needs to receive greater government services given their livelihoods trapped in a failed state. Moreover, the form and extent of fiscal demands may not always emerge from greater inclusion and representation in state institutions after the introduction of competitive elections. Instead, political inclusion may allow powerful groups to exploit access to consume resources at the expense of others and groups that are excluded and view corruption in provision as desiring of more redistribution.

To further interrogate the applicability of our logic to a nascent regime's fiscal *potential*, we investigate the conditions under which citizens' preferences change to favor greater redistribution if a weak leviathan delivers on a fair fiscal bargain. First, we argue that variation in a form of what Levi 1989 terms "quasi-voluntary compliance" serves to mediate preferences. Quasi-voluntary compliance arises when the state provides enough coercive capacity to threaten enforcement should citizens fail to comply with taxation, but does not require the leviathan to consistently or directly enforce payment in every instance. Citizens then grow to trust that others are paying "their fair

reversion or breakdown altogether—often quickly develop semi-authoritarian tendencies that attempt to work around the possible accountability mechanism enforced by the voting public while at the same time advancing competitive elections to help strengthen legitimacy and gain citizens' compliance.

share” and a self-reinforcing equilibrium arises where citizens agree to pay taxes. But in fragile states, citizens reasonably doubt the government’s enforcement ability and may also live in conflict-affected communities with variable bonds of social solidarity necessary for collection action. We therefore contend that despite a weak leviathan’s tax capacity, quasi-voluntary compliance will obtain and citizens express greater support for redistribution when a fragile government demonstrates a revenue-to-services transfer. We predict that *positive perceptions toward redistribution are most likely reinforced if citizens believe that the government will spend revenue in exchange for services* (H3). This means that a form of quasi-voluntary compliance can arise even if the government lacks robust enforcement or citizens have problems trusting others’ contributions simply by the government using revenue to provide services.

A second condition that likely mediates redistributive preferences in conflict-settings relates to how citizens discount the future given their prior experience with violence and ongoing political instability. Where states can provide a modicum of security and demonstrate a basic monopoly over coercion, citizens view security conditions with less uncertainty. As a result, these citizens are more apt to believe they will benefit from redistribution in their lifetime. However, past or future violence exposure affects people’s perceptions of risk, including their willingness to pay taxes now and their expectations of receiving services down the road. In fragile states suffering from significantly higher than normal economic uncertainty due to instability, we posit that *citizens who are accepting of greater risk are more likely to favor redistribution; whereas individuals who are risk averse are less likely* (H4).

4 Setting

We study the effects of state fragility on citizens’ preferences for redistribution in Afghanistan, an especially unique and important case to examine the observable implications of our theoretical approach given recent shocks to its institutions and the regeneration of political authority after state collapse.

Despite centuries of foreign occupation and invasion, the modern history of Afghanistan has

included a fairly unified territory and cohesive governing institutions.⁷⁶ After 1923, King Amanullah worked to establish a constitutional monarchy, and from 1963 to 1973, King Shah allowed greater political inclusion and reforms, including ceding some power to a parliament (Wolesi Jirga).⁷⁷ But factional fighting between ideological, ethnic, and regional interests would halt progress towards more inclusive and representative government. From the 1970s onwards, decades of internecine conflict and a Soviet occupation to support a weak communist regime eroded the centralized state. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, insurgents who had fought against the Soviets turned against each other to struggle for power in the early 1990s. The Taliban, a heavily Pashtun Islamist sect of insurgents based in the South (with support from Pakistan), rose to power in the midst of these sectarian battles and while the group would manage to gain some support from segments of the population, conflict had all but destroyed existing state institutions and any sense of a legitimate national government or political center,⁷⁸ which was further eroded by the Taliban's oppressive practices and criminal behavior. The lack of functional institutions forced many Afghans to rely on local self-help and warlords for protection and social welfare provision,⁷⁹ so that by 2001, the country was a failed state and humanitarian disaster.

After the ouster of the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks and US invasion, the US and NATO allies worked with a transitional government to re-craft institutions and build infrastructure to construct a new state, including providing security, ending the insurgency, and addressing critical welfare needs. A grand council (jirga) of elites from all walks of Afghan life (but without the Taliban) worked to establish the Transitional and Constitutional Loya Jirga tasked with forming a new government at the Bonn Conference from 2001–2004. The conference passed a new constitution that re-established a Wolesi Jirga (now popularly elected) serving alongside an elected president. Hamid Karzai, from a powerful (anti-Taliban) Pashtun family in the South, was selected as the first president at Bonn, ratified by voters in the country's first national election in 2004. In 2005, the first parliamentary elections seated members to the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai won re-election in 2009 following a disputed result, and parliamentary elections were again held in 2010. A transfer

⁷⁶In 1747, Ahmad Shah united the ethnically Pashtun tribes (based in the country's East and South) with Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and others (based in the North and West) within the country's modern border.

⁷⁷Barfield 2010.

⁷⁸Rubin 2013.

⁷⁹Mukhopadhyay 2014.

of executive power occurred in 2014 from Karzai to Ashraf Ghani following disputed results and subsequent vote audit.

Afghanistan has a unique electoral system and electoral rules⁸⁰ that inform key components of our empirical tests. Afghans elect members to parliament who run at large for multiple seats within 34 provinces without formal party affiliations. The number of seats allocated to each province is based on population projections. Afghans cast a single non-transferable vote and winning candidates are declared based on their rank compared to the number of seats for each province. This has important implications for how policy preferences among the population might transpose to their demands. MPs tend to represent narrow constituencies of closely aligned co-ethnics, co-tribe, and family in their local communities, including clan (*qawm*) members.⁸¹ Per its new constitution and subsequent legislation, members of parliament play an important role influencing revenue collection and the distribution of government resources, including local spending on public goods. In the absence of established records of performance in office, communal and familial loyalties tend to predict patterns of political support and greater state access.⁸² In a nascent democracy that otherwise lacks consolidated democratic institutions but whose electoral system allows for wide inclusion of many communities (multi-member parliamentary districts), the candidates capable of winning seats in the first election (2005) are most likely those who command “loyalty” from the population.

Despite the important state-building gains after the fall of the Taliban and the survival of incipient democratic institutions today, Afghanistan remains a fragile state that increasingly confronts challenge to its authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy. The government lacks a monopoly on the control of violence. While the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan government forces pushed back the Taliban insurgency in the early 2000s, insurgents have re-emerged, morphed, and expanded operations over the last 10 years, particularly during election periods,⁸³ and increasingly featuring fighters from the Islamic State. Taliban insurgents have re-inserted themselves into competitive governance with the regime by providing local services in areas that they control to peel away support for the government and further their political aims. The

⁸⁰Christia et al. 2016.

⁸¹Jung and Long 2018.

⁸²Coburn and Larson 2014.

⁸³Condra et al. 2017.

inability of the government to provide security, law, and order undermines Afghans' perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to comply with the regime.⁸⁴

Beyond security, the government faces additional capacity problems. Because many politicians in the Afghan government are elites from non-democratic eras, including warlords and former insurgents,⁸⁵ the institutional matrix of Afghanistan suffers from widespread mismanagement and under-performance, from corruption in the security sector⁸⁶ to fraudulent elections⁸⁷ and a perceived lack of government legitimacy on the part of some of the population.⁸⁸ Another critical problem of low state capacity involves fiscal contracting specifically. Though the current government struggles to sustainably collect taxes from citizens, forms of non-extortionary and extortionary taxation are historically present that persist today.⁸⁹ Today, while the Afghan economy is increasingly integrated with global markets, most citizens, who are not otherwise engaged in the information economy, work as small farmers, sell livestock, work in textile production, mining, or for the government in urban localities.⁹⁰ Outside of Kabul, Afghans mostly live in remote, rural villages with infrequent contact with state functionaries.⁹¹ Many regions are marked by rough terrain that is costly and difficult to access by officials.⁹² Afghanistan suffers a low tax base because tax laws and enforcement are ambiguous, which creates substantial opportunities for bribe-seeking.⁹³ As a result, the country has proved far less capable of raising revenue than other poor countries,⁹⁴ and tax collection is often seen as an extortionary process to pay government officials for services, rather than one which will benefit the country as a whole. Further, a vast majority of Afghanistan's revenue originates from

⁸⁴Condra et al. 2018 demonstrate that citizens' perceptions of the government's legitimacy is reliant on the quality of their interactions with police, and that an increased police presence at voting stations decreased voter turnout, likely due to the pervasive impression of the security forces are corrupt.

⁸⁵Mukhopadhyay 2014.

⁸⁶Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012.

⁸⁷Callen and Long 2015.

⁸⁸Berman et al. 2018.

⁸⁹Barfield 2010. Early rulers were periodically successful in raising revenue from agriculture. Amad Shah introduced a light form of taxation in tribal areas where he governed compared to heavy taxation of non-tribal areas of the empire, and in the early 1800s, Dost Muhammad expanded harsh forms of taxation in communities once he gained control of them by allowing his soldiers to effectively pillage. Taxation after the 1970s would occur by powerful warlords in control of local territory, including political actors capable of controlling border areas and therefore trade.

⁹⁰Ghani, Nehan and Massoud 2007.

⁹¹According to the World Bank, 36% of the population lives below the poverty line and many households survive off subsistence agriculture.

⁹²Jones 2008.

⁹³Rasmussen N.d..

⁹⁴Afghanistan's annual domestic revenue is 4.5% of GDP, while both Pakistan and Thailand are able to mobilize about 17% of their GDP (Rubin 2013.)

outside sources as most humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts are funded by NATO, NGOs, and other foreign actors.⁹⁵

Perhaps unsurprisingly, political elites capitalize on this fragile fiscal state of affairs in several ways. Many ruling elites have ample access to foreign capital, including development aid and direct investment, that allows them to grow rich even in the absence of a secure property rights regime and legal capacity. They also focus these investments to generate profits on the international stage, such as through mining operations, natural resource exploration, the illicit opium trade, and the off-shoring of financial assets.⁹⁶ Together, these alternative sources of capital undermine the need for elites to raise revenue broadly from the local population.

This case context suggests that for Afghans, forms of exit, voice, and loyalty are all plausible and reasonable drivers of redistributive preferences. While much of the population desperately needs improved services, they perhaps express low expectations of the new government or turn elsewhere. Exposure to violence, corruption, and the failure of the government to provide services no doubt influences citizens' behavior. What redistributive expectations do Afghans express of their government, if any, and what are the conditions under which they favor more or less policy action to increase government-provided fiscal capacity?

5 Empirical Strategy

Individual-level survey data prove critical to test our hypotheses since perceptual data of citizens' views of the state and their concomitant beliefs about redistribution can only be gained by asking them. We accordingly exploit data from a novel survey of Afghan citizens that we designed and implemented in August 2010, in the weeks leading up to the Wolesi Jirga parliamentary elections in September. While limiting our empirical investigation to one country does not allow variation across weak state settings, our approach does allow us to exploit variation in *perceptions* of and experience with the state, which can vary across individuals, holding other contextual variables constant. The survey includes respondents from all regions of the country and the capital Kabul;

⁹⁵From 2002–2004, 7.6% of Afghanistan's expenditures came from domestic revenue, while 26.4% was from international assistance facilitated by the government and 66% from external aid not facilitated by the government. Ten years later, 64% of the national budget was from international sources.

⁹⁶Partlow 2016.

sampled from 450 randomly selected polling stations across the provincial capitals in 19 (of 34) provinces, with 2,904 total respondents (including 50% female).⁹⁷ To strengthen inferential claims, we leverage additional features of our data, including a plausibly exogenous source of variation on state access, and include validity checks regarding omitted individual and contextual variables, selection effects, and measurement. We view our empirical exercise as providing new, if suggestive, evidence about the factors that shape redistributive attitudes in the context of a weak state that provides an unprecedented lens into early state-building. Our study contributes evidence from a new setting to theoretical models of redistribution,⁹⁸ similar to other studies from the developing world that use observational survey data to test preferences at the individual-level.⁹⁹

Dependent Variable

To obtain a measure of Afghans’ expressed preferences for greater redistribution, we asked: “Thinking about other communities in Afghanistan, which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? Please choose option 1 or 2: (Randomize Ordering; Single Mention): 1. The government should help poor communities raise their income; 2. People in poorer communities need to work harder if they want to catch up.”¹⁰⁰ We code “Pro-Redistribution” =1 if respondents chose option 1, =0 if they chose option 2.¹⁰¹ Following a similar conceptual logic guiding the application of redistributive preferences gained from a similar survey measure replicated from Sniderman et al. (1991), our question specifically asks about whether the government should intervene to help “poor” communities, linking our main theoretical concern of the state’s redistributive capacity on preferences for redistribution. We adopt similar language to measure preferences with similar wording in a different context, and specifically prime respondents to think about “other” communities to distinguish more deeply felt commitments to redistribution as an important public good rather than

⁹⁷While our sample lacks national representativeness given administrative and security challenges, our selection procedure constitutes representative samples from the provincial locales we visited (see Appendix).

⁹⁸Boix 2001, Meltzer and Richard 1981.

⁹⁹Albertus and Menaldo 2014, Dion and Birchfield 2010, Haggard, Kaufman and Long 2013.

¹⁰⁰The ordering of answer options was randomized to prevent response bias from ordering or framing effects.

¹⁰¹Descriptive statistics for all variables used in analyses are in Table 4. We drop “don’t know” and “refused-to-answer” answers since a lack of knowledge or opinion does not indicate how one would have answered had they not lacked certainty. This accounts for slightly varying sample sizes in the results tables, but the proportions of don’t know/refused-to-answer responses are small enough not to introduce significant bias in analyses (Krosnick, Revilla and Saris 2014).

prime respondents to answer simply as a means of distributional patronage for themselves. With this measure, 57% of respondents express pro-redistribution preferences compared to 43% who did not.

Explanatory Variables

To test our first set of hypotheses on citizens' views of the state, we employ measures regarding citizens' perceptions of the government's authority that are indicative of compliance with the regime. We adopt a similar method to measure these concepts empirically that were developed, tested, and shown reliable in other contexts.¹⁰² Specifically, following Levi and Sacks 2009, we employ questions probing beliefs regarding government judicial procedures and the outcomes of government behavior to measure citizens' perceptions of the government's legitimacy following its "procedural" and "performance" conceptual bases. Necessarily, differentiating beliefs about procedures from outcomes is difficult as those concepts are not always distinct when it comes to a state's institutional behavior or as understood by citizens. However, separating them is also not crucial for the test of our first hypothesis and we do not have theoretical priors on differences between the levels of effects for procedural or performance legitimacy – rather, our prediction is that positive perceptions of both should increase the likelihood that citizens favor more redistribution. Recognizing a lack of precise conceptual clarity for measurement, but not wanting any one single "fuzzy" measure to drive our results, we obtained separate measures that we believe reflect either procedures, outcomes, or both, and that reflect the state-building dynamics of Afghanistan and include those in our tests.

Accordingly, we first asked respondents questions regarding their beliefs about the state's security and judicial procedures as a marker for their perceptions of its ability and legitimate authority to exercise political control and implement rule of law. Given that a state's basic core function is to monopolize violence, citizens' viewing it as the legitimate provider of security, even if it is not always robust, is critical for state-building. Specifically, we inquired about whether respondents

¹⁰²Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009, Levi, Tyler and Sacks 2012. Survey items that proxy for compliance and perceptions of legitimacy may confront measurement issues, particularly when employed across different settings. However, Levi and Sacks 2009, 320 demonstrate construct validity and reliability of similar survey items as ours using cross-national Afrobarometer data. For example, they capture legitimacy as a dependent variable response to the following question: "The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes." Furthermore, using survey data from the United States and Afrobarometer, Levi, Tyler and Sacks 2012 show that varying measures of trust toward the police and other state actors are reliable measures of procedural legitimacy.

would be willing to report information about possible insurgent activity to the government with two variables regarding pending improvised explosive devices attacks (*IED*) and citizens' willingness to share information about insurgents to Afghan security forces (*Info Sharing*).¹⁰³ Sharing information about insurgent activity is both costly for individuals and critical for counter-insurgency success.¹⁰⁴ Willingness to report on insurgent activity to security forces suggests that citizens view the government as the relevant source of providing order, could reflect either beliefs in procedures or outcomes (if it helps the government to combat insurgency and prevent civilian casualties), and therefore forms critical proxies for whether citizens having "opted-in" to the authority of the regime vis-a-vis non-state actors.¹⁰⁵ Second, we more narrowly focus on judicial procedures and ask a question interrogating beliefs about whether respondents believe that Afghan security forces have the right to arrest a respondent's friend who has committed a crime, *Friend Arrest*.¹⁰⁶ While the law formally vests the authority for the police to arrest a person suspected of committing a crime, the public may not recognize the government's "rightful rule" in this matter, particularly in societies where non-state informal or violent actors provide order and jurisprudence.¹⁰⁷ We also interrogate people's perceptions that are more likely indicative of performance legitimacy by creating a variable from a question asking respondents whether they think it is the responsibility of government to deliver services in their area (*Government Delivers*). The available responses purposefully mention government bodies alongside non-government actors (like ethnic or religious leaders) who frequently alternatively provide services in the Afghan context. A government response is a signal indicating a preference for governance and service delivery from formal state institutions as opposed to non-state actors. As a measure of government provision of basic critical services, we also asked respondents if they have regular access to *Electricity*, a much-needed service which also represents a government's

¹⁰³Both coded as =1 if respondents reply that it is very or somewhat important to report, =0 if they reply that it is not important; both measures correlate highly as expected and demonstrating reliability of these measures.

¹⁰⁴Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011. Shaver and Shapiro 2016 find that insurgent-caused civilian deaths increased the propensity for civilians to anonymously report "tips" on insurgents to counter-insurgent forces in Iraq.

¹⁰⁵Relatedly, Condra et al. 2018 find that perceptions of state legitimacy generally and security forces specifically affected whether or not Afghans voted in the 2010 election, with lower turnout arising from perceived corruption.

¹⁰⁶=1 if true; =0 otherwise.

¹⁰⁷We specify a hypothetical situation involving the respondent's friend to more forcefully have the person express a belief about the government; had we asked the question more generally, we believe many more respondents would reply affirmatively, however, by imposing the "penalty" of having the arrest occur to one's friend as opposed to just anyone, respondents must more clearly express beliefs about the government that require some potential cost analogous to signaling compliance.

basic ability to provide for its people.¹⁰⁸

To test our second set of hypotheses regarding political inclusion, we exploit unique features of the election’s timing mapped onto its electoral institutions to develop a plausibly exogenous source of variation in state access to disentangle the possible endogenous effects of preferences on perceptions of legitimacy. This includes a novel measure of political access gained in the survey, just before the 2010 election, that reveals likely patterns of loyalty between the population and political leaders that predate democratic institutions, and therefore cannot be endogenous to political selection or government performance after elections, but whose importance vests after the creation of the new government. Because the survey was conducted during an electoral period, we leverage the fact that many Afghans are related to sitting members of parliament (or candidates seeking office) due to their *qawm* (sub-clan, or extended family) membership.¹⁰⁹ 20% of respondents report direct relations with sitting MPs. With the timing of the survey in 2010 (only the first for MP re-election) and aspects of the nature of political competition and electoral rules described in Setting, Afghan voters would reasonably view strong familial relations (determined at birth) as important cues for indicating the likelihood that they had or would benefit from loyalty bonds to MPs as mapped onto new state institutions after the introduction of elections in the first election, but before patterns of clientelism have been shaped by how democratic institutions develop over time or before a politician has faced the pressures of re-election. The citizen-MP relation via shared *qawm* membership provides us with a more direct measure of likely preferential access to state resources. Leveraging this measure helps to better isolate the effects of political dynamics arising from the state’s “supply” of fiscal capacity on citizen’s demands today (2010) from what likely shaped their demands *before* democratic institutions could shape the nature of political competition and patterns of clientelism. Next, we obtain measures on why respondents believe they do not receive more services from government. If they mention a “misuse of funds” as the reason for not receiving more from MPs (*MP Misuse*) and

¹⁰⁸Coded as =1 if they have access for most or part of the day, =0 if they only have occasional access or none at all. Electricity has specific resonance as a proxy for state capacity in Afghanistan (Rubin and Risen 2011, 173) and other developing countries like Uganda (Callen et al. 2016).

¹⁰⁹A *qawm* in Afghanistan proves very important to local collective action, governance, and community solidarity (Barfield 2010). We code the variable *MP Qawm* as =1 if the respondent said that they had a sitting MP who comes from their *qawm*, and =0 otherwise. As a placebo check, we also include a similar measure, *Qawm Candidate*, =1 if the respondent reported having a *qawm* member running in the current election.

the central government (*Central Misuse*),¹¹⁰ we predict this perception plausibly generates feelings of marginalization.

To explore our third set of hypotheses on the conditions under which preferences may change in the presence of the state’s potential to supply a fiscal bargain, we test the effects of quasi-voluntary compliance and risk-taking. Per fiscal theories, citizens who pay taxes will support redistribution assuming a functioning state that enforces compliance and translates revenue from the population into public goods. But nascent governments like Afghanistan lack institutional performance to do so; taxation may be limited to formal sector employment or bribe payments to government officials. Therefore people’s general ideas about taxation may be driven more by a belief that taxes are extortionary, funds are wasted, or should only support formal-sector workers than from strong redistributive preferences. We first gauge general attitudes regarding beliefs in the importance of paying taxes to the government, *Pay Tax*.¹¹¹ To measure quasi-voluntary compliance, *QVC*, we asked a follow-up question directly after *Pay Tax* that primed respondents with: “Now let us suppose that the government will always use your tax money to provide services. In your opinion, how important is it for you to pay taxes: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?” We code *QVC* =1 for respondents that first disagreed with the importance of paying taxes but once they were prompted with additional information that the government would use revenue for services, agreed it is important.¹¹² To measure individuals’ propensity to take risks, we asked whether respondents would be willing to take risks regarding household finances, *Risk*, measured on an ordinal scale from 0 “unwilling to take risks” to 10 “fully prepared to take risks.”

To account for potential confounders,¹¹³ we follow prior studies on preferences in the developing world and thus investigate the individual level correlates of preferences for redistribution derived from individuals’ socio-economic profile, including *Education*, gender (*Female*), and capital city residence (*Kabul*). To control for salient ethnic dynamics related to multiple aspects of the case, we

¹¹⁰Construct validity and reliability of these measures are demonstrated by comparing responses with the same question in Kenya, Uganda, and Ghana.

¹¹¹Coded as =1 if individuals think it is very or somewhat important to pay taxes to the government; and =0 otherwise.

¹¹²*QVC*=0 for respondents who either agree that paying taxes is important regardless of whether they are primed that taxes will be used for services or for respondents who never agree that paying taxes is important even if the government provides services.

¹¹³See Appendix for coding for all covariates.

include a *Pashtun* dummy for co-ethnics of the largest ethnic group, one that typically has controlled the central government and shared by president Karzai and a group that reflects the group most likely to support the Taliban and occupying lands where the Taliban is strongest. Pashtuns could differentially expect more from the state compared to non-Pashtuns or systematically avoid the state and turn elsewhere for governance.

6 Results

We estimate maximum likelihood models given the binary nature of our outcome of interest, Afghans' expressed support in favor of greater government redistribution.¹¹⁴ Positive coefficients demonstrate increased likelihood of pro-redistribution preferences. Coefficients show marginal effects, with other variables held at their means and standard errors clustered by the primary sampling unit (polling station). Table 1 displays the effects of perceptions of government legitimacy to test our first hypothesis; Table 2 examines factors that drive citizen support due to greater political inclusion or exclusion to test our second prediction; and Table 3 investigates the conditions under which Afghans increase their likelihood of supporting a fiscal bargain based on quasi-voluntary compliance and risk-taking.

First, results in Table 1 suggest that that respondents who attribute procedural and outcome legitimacy to the government are more willing to support greater government redistribution. *IED* and *Information-Sharing* both positively and significantly increase the likelihood of supporting redistribution by about nine and 11 percentage points, respectively. Similarly, respondents who approve of the police's ability to arrest a friend who has committed a crime, *Friend Arrest*, increases the likelihood of pro-redistributive by about 12 percentage points. Respondents who view a government body as responsible for providing services (as opposed to non-state agents) (*Government Delivers*) are about six percentage points more likely to support redistribution, and people with access to *Electricity* are positively pre-disposed to redistribution (but the coefficient is not well estimated, $p=0.3$). These results demonstrate confirmatory evidence in support of hypothesis 1.

Second, in Table 2, respondents related to sitting MPs were about nine percentage points less

¹¹⁴We re-estimate linear probability models in the Appendix.

Table 1: Effects of Legitimacy on Redistributive Preferences

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
IED	0.09 [†] (0.05)				
Info Share		0.11* (0.05)			
Friend Arrest			0.12* (0.05)		
Government Delivers				0.06 [†] (0.03)	
Electricity					0.02 (0.02)
Education	-0.04 [†] (0.02)				
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
N	2845	2801	2904	2874	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

likely to support redistribution, suggesting that people with direct access to the fruits of the state are less likely to want to share those gains.¹¹⁵ Consistent with these results on inclusion, respondents who express criticism of politicians for misusing funds that are allocated for resources as the reason they do not receive more services from MPs or the central government were four and five points more likely to favor redistribution. These results support our second hypothesis that citizens who more directly benefit from preferential access from political inclusion are less likely to value fairness and redistribution as a more efficient system for allocating resources, whereas citizens that do not stand to gain from inclusion but instead feel excluded expressed through perceptions of corruption from government service delivery prefer more redistribution in a system where they have been thus far disadvantaged.

¹¹⁵We include in model 2 whether or not a respondent was related by *qawm* to a *candidate* running for office in the 2010 election as a placebo check on inclusion to differentiate the effect of *qawm* membership with candidates who are powerful enough to win in the first elections from those who simply to decide to run for office whether powerful or not. Results are similarly negative and significant, but also substantially smaller for this group (five points), suggesting a unique effect of state access from shared relations to sitting MPs who won in 2005, not just those running in 2010.

Table 2: Effects of Political Inclusion on Redistributive Preferences

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
MP Qawm	-0.09*** (0.03)			
Qawm Candidate		-0.05* (0.03)		
MP Misuse			0.04† (0.02)	
Central Misuse				0.05* (0.02)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Num. obs.	2714	2704	2818	2851

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Third, we investigate our third set of hypotheses on the conditions under which Afghan respondents increase their likelihood of supporting a fiscal bargain with the government. First, given the state's lack of tax compliance and distortionary means of collecting, we first control for respondents' beliefs about the importance of taxation. Table 3 shows that people who find it important to *Pay Tax* to the government without any mention of how that revenue will be spent are about six percentage points *less* likely to favor redistribution, demonstrating that there is not a direct link between taxation and redistribution in Afghanistan. In a fragile state setting with distortionary, inconsistent, variable taxation this is perhaps not surprising, and provides an important reason to extend the basic insights of fiscal theories to examine the conditions under which weak fiscal bargains may not provide the intended effect but rather push citizens away from supporting fiscal bargains.¹¹⁶ But to examine conditions under which preferences may change, once the survey prompts that

¹¹⁶ *Pay Tax* could also proxy for different sentiments related to the aspects we highlight above, including citizens who are closer to state access due to employment in the formal sector and subject to income tax, but who want to limit the government's redistributive policies, echoing results from Table 2 and which we return to below.

taxes will be collected by the government will use funds for service provision, individuals expressing quasi-voluntary compliance, *QVC*, are seven percentage points *more* likely to favor redistribution. Regarding risk, results show that a unit increase in willingness to take economic risks is associated with a one percent increase in support for redistribution: less risk-aversion is positively associated with pro-poor government spending. Demonstrations of quasi-voluntary compliance and risk mediate preferences, two important extensions of extant theories to fragile states to understand the conditions under which citizens could grow in favor of redistribution even where the state otherwise lacks robust tax capacity.

Table 3: Quasi-Voluntary Compliance and Risk-Taking

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Pay Tax	-0.06** (0.02)		
QVC		0.07** (0.02)	
Risk			0.01* (0.00)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 [†] (0.02)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
N	2904	2904	2904


*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

For ease of interpretation and to compare coefficients across tests from Tables 1, 2, and 3, Figure 1 plots each of our main variables effects' size and 95% confidence intervals extracted from our main models.

Given prior literature's focus on socio-demographic variables, we summarize results from our demographic covariates across main tests. *Education* significantly but weakly affects preferences (more educated respondents are less likely to favor redistribution), and *Female* is not consistently

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Legitimacy, Political Inclusion, Quasi-Voluntary Compliance & Risk



(a) Main variables effects' size at the $p < 0.1$ level, with point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Tables 1, 2, and 3.

well-estimated. Similar to results elsewhere, we find that residence in the capital city *Kabul* are less likely to favor redistribution, perhaps as a result that they are wealthier or enjoy better state access. *Pashtuns* appear about 11-12 percentage points more likely to support redistribution, perhaps reflecting pro-government attitudes and beliefs that they will preferentially benefit from greater government policy action.

Robustness

We perform a series of robustness checks to address possible threats to validity explored further in the Appendix and summarized here. First, our results are robust to linear probability models

(Tables 5, 6, 7). Beyond conditioning our tests on individual-level observables above, we account for additional omitted variables by including province-level fixed effects to control for local factors, such as demography, ethnic diversity, and political competition that may drive variation in outcomes related to state capacity, access to services, and geography. In Tables 8, 9, 10, point estimates with provincial controls remain stable compared to our main results and are understandably less well-estimated. While variation in preferences are unsurprisingly in part driven by local factors, it does not appear that provincial factors bias the coefficient estimates in our main results above.

Second, beyond addressing potential endogeneity between preferences and views of state with our MP *qawm* measure, we further interrogate possible selection effects if, for example, respondents who were more pre-disposed to support redistribution ended up in our survey sample given its bias towards larger population centers, which would naturally both raise the plausible expectations for redistribution among citizens and also increase their access to state institutions and therefore what (large or small) fiscal capacity it demonstrates. We create a variable called *Big City* capturing the four largest regional capitals (Herat in the West, Jalalabad in the East, Kandahar in the South, and Mazar-e-Sharif in the North) to compare against smaller provincial capitals that are equivalent to towns or large villages. Results in Tables 11, 12, and 13 suggest that while the effects of *Kabul* residence are consistently negative, *Big City* residence does not seem affect attitudes compared to residence in large towns or villages.¹¹⁷ While capital city residence has a unique effect on preferences, residence in big regional capitals versus smaller provincial centers does not affect preferences, suggesting that selection into regional centers compared to provincial towns does not appear to account for our results.¹¹⁸

Third, we perform a series of confirmatory tests on observables that prior literature suggests should drive preferences for redistribution based on respondents' socio-demographic profile in developing countries, including income and occupation, separate from experience with and perceptions of institutional features of the state. In Table 15, income has a significant and negative affect on

¹¹⁷We caution strong inferences from this variable due to a lack of true representative urban-rural variation.

¹¹⁸Additionally, controlling for whether a respondent reports that they were born in the district where they currently reside does not affect our results, suggesting that migration patterns also do not account for our results and there are not respondents choosing "exit" systematically into some places and not others as an explanation for pro or anti-government action. Of course, any Afghan completely choosing "exit" by leaving the country would not appear in our sample, which more appropriately focuses our study on citizens who confront the Hobbesian bargain.

preferences, but respondents that had recently experienced unexpected drops in income were more likely to support redistribution, matching similar expectations from the Meltzer-Richard model that wealthier individuals are less likely to prefer redistribution and more vulnerable individuals more likely.¹¹⁹ Table 16 examines occupational categories and accords with many results accord with findings across other studies and also intuitive in the Afghan context. People employed in casual labor and the informal economy are less likely perhaps because they are more subject to extortionary forms of taxation or bribe-taking, while respondents employed in some formal sectors, including by the government, are about six percentage points more likely to support redistribution. However, those employed in the security sector specifically are about 28 points less likely, which may accord with general beliefs about the specific venal nature of the police and army in Afghanistan.¹²⁰ In these additional tests controlling for numerous individual-level economic and social factors from the literature, we generate results largely consistent with those from other developing country contexts.

Last, we address possible problems of measurement. In the Research Design above, we discuss the construct validity and reliability of our measures of government legitimacy as compared to other studies and to each other. We further bolster this discussion with evidence in Table ?? across all of our measures. Second, we look at whether an unobserved latent factor systematically drove responses to our outcome variable on redistributive preferences and core explanatory variables, if, for instance, respondents did not provide their true opinions to those questions but rather gave responses that may have either been uniformly pro or anti-government from social desirability or another spurious factor. The correlation coefficients between these variables would need to be consistent and consistently large for an unobserved variable to be driving responses across these variables, which does not appear to be the case in Table ??.

While our study cannot definitely rule out all possible confounding factors to precisely estimate the causal relationship between state supply and citizen demand, the conclusion of our empirical

¹¹⁹We utilized different measures of income based on prior studies that evaluate the perception of upward mobility and experience with income shocks; our results accord with these studies that demonstrate individuals who perceive increasing fortune on their part are less likely to support redistribution Benabou and Ok 2001, ? while individuals with a recent history of financial trauma through unexpected loss of income are more likely to support pro-poor government intervention (Alesina and Giuliano 2009).

¹²⁰These results are consistent with the theoretical and empirical arguments in Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011 that sectoral differences impact social insurance preferences in the developing world. However, in our data, each occupational category only provides a few hundred responses at most, so we note these models fit estimation on small sample sizes.

exercise after subjecting it to numerous sensitive analyses gives us further confidence that citizens' experience with state institutions powerfully shape their beliefs about the fiscal contract in fragile states.

7 Discussion & Conclusion

This paper investigates the relationship between the supply and demand for redistribution in fragile developing states where many citizens would benefit from robust policy action, but where emergent regimes have not yet successfully established fiscal constitutions. Citizens' experiences with, and expectations of, state institutions at the early stages of state-building strongly influence their demands. Even in the context of Afghanistan, a fragile state in the early stages of state-building, preferences toward redistribution are moderated by citizens' relationship with the state, despite the fact that nearly all Afghans would benefit from greater redistributive action on the part of the government.

Afghanistan is of course unique in many respects; it differs from other poor countries that enjoy more solid institutional footing and greater potential fiscal capacity. Even though the state has yet to succeed at properly implementing and fulfilling fiscal bargains, Afghan citizens express important variation in preferences for redistribution, and in some surprising ways. Yet it is also characteristic of many fragile states today that have experienced institutional disruption, new political authority, contested governance, in periods of state-building a regime change in the 21st century, like Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. Afghanistan, like other weak states, faces fundamental challenges related to state-building and provides insights into how governments and citizens interact early on in this process, building on canonical accounts of fiscal growth in Weberian states that already experience solidified political authority, fiscal capacity, and compliance. Moreover, from a state-society perspective,¹²¹ Afghanistan reflects many dynamics of political competition in a weak state vying to govern a strong, traditional society loosely organized by a network of competing political elites, some of whom offer formal and informal forms of governance. Afghanistan also exemplifies modern state-building efforts supported by direct international involvement,¹²² where institutions

¹²¹Migdal 1988.

¹²²Lake 2016

are propped up by external assistance and financing – such as in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor – and political leaders must win elections that impose new forms of political competition and survival that have often been destabilizing for institutional development and policy stability – such as South Sudan and Iraq. Accordingly, we believe our results speak broadly to scholars interested in preferences for government policy action in the developing world and provide comparative theoretical, empirical, and policy insights to diverse literatures.

First, we speak to literatures in the political economy of development and international relations regarding the institutional determinants of state-building and long-run economic performance. Scholars highlight specifically that core features of the fiscal contract lay at the foundations of the consolidation of political authority and economic growth,¹²³ the rise of representative government,¹²⁴ and political competition in many modern industrialized democracies.¹²⁵ Fiscal theories of the state highlight the supply side importance of institutions capable of taxing and spending in ways to guarantee the leviathan’s political survival.¹²⁶ Studying variation in state capacity following a momentous institutional shock such as the overthrow of the Taliban and US invasion allows us to speak to how the fiscal state grows and consolidates in real-time at an historical critical juncture, similar to studies that leverage the timing of critical historical events (like the Glorious Revolution),¹²⁷ or study long-run fiscal development from endogenous institutional change but lack robust empirical foundations of institutional quality and citizens perceptions to test hypotheses on the demands for redistribution before and as the state building fiscal capacity.¹²⁸ While we cannot benchmark the institutional disruption of Afghanistan’s fiscal capacity relative to the disruption to, or progress from, other institutional dynamics, we note that the fiscal bargain between ruler and ruled lays at the foundation of modern state-building and constitutional orders much as it has in earlier periods. We put fiscal institutions at the center of state-building and show that helping one set of institutions can help another. Even before the state demonstrates strong fiscal capacity, by working to build out and improve its capacity along other institutional dimensions, related to pro-

¹²³Tilly 1993.

¹²⁴North and Weingast 1989.

¹²⁵Boix 2001.

¹²⁶Bates and Lien 1985, Levi 1989.

¹²⁷North and Weingast 1989.

¹²⁸Kiser and Barzel 1991.

cedures and outcomes for example, our study points to the importance of the basket of institutions and institutional sequencing in fragile states. Our results demonstrate that, at least in Afghanistan, state capacity does not just matter for public policy outcomes generally, but also for the degree to which people express demands of the government in the first instance.

Second, we contribute to theoretical models and empirical studies that focus on the institutional and individual factors driving preferences for redistribution in developing countries. Numerous scholars point to institutional features of poor countries that may take on different contours compared to industrialized democracies,¹²⁹ including regime type,¹³⁰ elite capture, and clientelism¹³¹ as important factors that influence governments' pursuit of social and economic policies. Our study speaks to this body of work by focusing on the role of political institutions as an important characteristic influencing fiscal supply, however, our study differs in important ways. We note that rather than assume the first order endogenous effects of fiscal capacity on political institutions within cases,¹³² or exploit cross-national variation in institutional variables,¹³³ we instead focus on variation in state supply and citizen contact within the state in a unique institutional environment after sudden and exogenous political shocks. Echoing the challenges that all fragile states have consolidating authority, Afghanistan suffers variation in its ability to project its authority, tax revenue, and provide services. This provides the opportunity to exploit variation in citizens' experience with the state and how that shapes their redistributive expectations. In so doing, we bring the demand side to the supply side of institutional approaches without waiting around for institutional endowments to vest and change endogenously over a long period.

Third, by examining the conditions under which preferences may change, we extend the theoretical insights of quasi-voluntary compliance and risk preferences to fragile states where actual levels of taxation are low and exposure to violence is high. Our findings underscore the importance of the government demonstrating fiscal competence and the role of risk aversion as conditions mediating preferences in fragile states that generally lack tax compliance and variables bonds of social solidarity. Accordingly, we also contribute to the growing empirical literature on how trust in institutions

¹²⁹Albertus and Menaldo 2014, Timmons 2005.

¹³⁰Persson and Tabellini 1999.

¹³¹Besley and Persson 2011.

¹³²North and Weingast 1989.

¹³³Haggard, Kaufman and Long 2013.

and violence affect a range of citizen attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors in developing countries and conflict settings.¹³⁴

Last, our study provides policy guidance alongside a burgeoning literature examining the empirical and policy components of state-building and institutional consolidation after foreign intervention and regime transition. 2 billion people occupy fragile states and suffer under-development and ongoing political disorder, from South Sudan to Western Pakistan, and across the conflict-ridden states associated with the Arab Spring. Questions of state-building, sovereignty, legitimacy, and how they influence citizens' behavior is therefore ripe for investigation and are growing increasingly relevant to addressing problems of human development and regional and global security. But institutional shocks to states in these cases also provide the ability to study empirical components of state-building in real time as governments face the opportunities and challenges of establishing authority. The consideration for emergent leviathans and their international partners is that inherent to any Hobbesian bargain are citizens who can exercise exit, voice, or loyalty – and do so in ways that help them survive. While scholars and policymakers aggressively advocate for institutional strengthening to rebuild order, numerous policy components inherent in contemporary state-building may compound, rather than resolve, the governance paradox for nascent regimes. The question that states like Afghanistan confront now, approaching 20 years after the establishment of the post-Taliban leviathan, is for how long citizens will prove willing to shake the Hobbesian hand without a strong state presence before they exit altogether or support alternative governance sources that establish order and fiscal capacity?

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¹³⁴Bauer et al. 2016, Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011, Berman et al. 2018, Condra and Shapiro 2012.

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A Appendix

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A.1 Survey Sample

We fielded the survey a few weeks before the September 2010 parliamentary elections. As mentioned in the main text, several challenges affected the ability to draw a sample for our survey. Afghanistan has not conducted a recent census and has no voter registry, making any proportional distribution of the sample difficult and based on poor estimates. Security problems related to the ongoing insurgency and other violence made it dangerous to conduct surveys in many districts, as well as administratively and financially difficult. Therefore, a nationally-representative survey of Afghanistan was impossible at the time. As a result, we focused enumeration on areas within provincial centers across 19 (of 34) provinces, in all regions of the country, including all ISAF military commands and the capital city Kabul. In addition to Kabul, in the East, sampled provinces included Paktia, Parwan, Kapisa, Panjshir, Bamyan, and Nangarhar; in the North, Balkh, Faryab, Jozjan, Samangan, Badakhshan, and Takhar; in the West, Herat and Ghor; in the South, Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, and Dai Kundi. From these provincial lists, we sampled 450 randomly selected polling stations across the provincial capitals (proportionate to population size), with 2,904 total respondents (including 50% female). Within provincial centers, we used polling centers as primary sampling units. To obtain a representative sample of respondents living near polling centers, enumerators employed a random walk pattern starting at the polling center, with random selection of every fourth house or structure and random selection of respondents via Kish grid. Afghan enumerators conducted the survey in either Dari or Pashto—the two most spoken first languages—depending on the area and respondent’s choice. The survey consisted of 50 percent male and female respondents (with male and female enumerators conducting co-gender interviews). Enumerators conducted surveys with individuals separately from other household members to guarantee respon-

dent privacy. Although our sample biases towards more urban and safer areas under government control, we note that half of the polling centers in our sample reside in locations deemed to be in smaller towns or more rural locales (see below). While our results are not representative to the country as a whole, they are to the 19 provincial centers sampled.

A.2 Survey Measures and Coding Rules

Pro-Redistribution “Thinking about other communities in Afghanistan, which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? Please choose option 1 or 2: (RANDOMIZE ORDERING; SINGLE MENTION): The government should help poor communities raise their income/ People in poorer communities need to work harder if they want to catch up.”

Coding: =1 if option 1 selected; =0 if option 2 selection.

IED “We would like to understand how people in your community or communities similar to yours work to protect innocent people from the effects of violence, Please feel free to not discuss your community specifically, we just want to understand how Afghans think about these issues generally.” with follow-up: “In your opinion, how important is it for you to share information about a pending IED attack to the Afghan Security Forces: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?”

Coding: =1 if respondents reply “very” or “somewhat” important, =0 if they reply “not at all important.”

Info Share “We would like to understand how people in your community or communities similar to yours work to protect innocent people from the effects of violence, Please feel free to not discuss your community specifically, we just want to understand how Afghans think about these issues generally.” with follow-up: “In your opinion, how important is it for you to share information about insurgents to the Afghan security forces: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?”

Coding: Coding: =1 if respondents reply “very” or “somewhat” important, =0 if they reply “not at all important.”

Friend Arrest “Let us suppose that your friend committed a crime and that the Afghan security forces arrested them as a result. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that the Afghan security forces have the right to arrest your friend?”

Coding: =1 if “strongly” or “somewhat” agree, =0 if “somewhat” or “strongly” disagree.

Government Delivers “Who is mainly responsible for delivering services in your neighborhood (randomize ordering): the central government, your Member of Parliament, religious or ethnic leaders, the provincial government, or the community development council?”

Coding: =1 if respondents replied any government body (central government, member of parliament, provincial government, or community development council), and =0 if they replied non-state actor (religious or ethnic leaders).

Electricity “Are you able to use electricity in your house most of the day, only part of the day, only a few days a week, or not at all?”

Coding: “Most and only part of the day”=1 & “Only a few days a week and not at all”=0.

MP Qawm “Are any current MPs from your province members of your qawm?”

Coding: =1 if yes, =0 if no.

Qawm Candidate “Are any of the current candidates for the Wolesi Jirga from your province members of your qawm?”

Coding=1 if yes, =0 if no.

MP Misuse “In your opinion, which of the following is the most important reason you do not get more services from your Member of Parliament: misuse of funds, favoritism, or not enough money?”

Coding: =1 if “misuse of funds,” =0 otherwise.

Central Govt Misuse “In your opinion, which of the following is the most important reason you do not get more services from the central government: misuse of funds, favoritism, or not enough money?”

Coding: =1 if “misuse of funds,” =0 otherwise.

Pay Tax “In your opinion, how important is it for you to pay taxes to the government: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?”

Coding: =1 if “very” or “somewhat” important, =0 if “not at all important.”

Quasi-Voluntary Compliance (QVC) Follow-up to Pay Tax: “Now let us suppose that the government will always use your tax money to provide services. In your opinion, how important is it for you to pay taxes: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?”

Coding: =1 for respondents that disagree that it is important to pay taxes, but then agree to the follow-up in which revenue will be used for services; =0 for respondents who agree paying taxes is important regardless of whether they are primed that taxes will be used for services.

Risk “How willing are you to take risks regarding your household’s finances? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means ‘fully prepared to take risks.’” (respondents were shown a picture of a ladder scaled 0-10.)

Coding: finances measured on a scale from 0 “unwilling to take risks” to 10 “fully prepared to take risks.”

Kabul, *Coding:* =1 if Kabul residence, 0=otherwise.

Big City *Coding:* “Big City” = 1 if province= Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, or Mazar-e-Sharif & = 0 if otherwise (towns and large villages).

Female *Coding:* “Female” = 1 & “Male” = 0.

Urban If polling center is designated as an urban location.

Coding: “Urban” = 1 & “Rural” = 0.

Literate “What is the highest level of education that you have completed?” *Coding:* “Literate”= 1 for any amount of formal schooling & “Not gone to school / Illiterate”=0.

Pashtun Coding: =1 if respondent identifies as a Pashtun & =0 otherwise.

Income (ln) “How much income does your household earn in a normal month? Please include income from all sources and please do not subtract money that your family spends during the course of the month (record verbatim).” *Coding:* We take the log of their response (given verbatim in *Afghanis*).

Income Drop “In the past year, have there been any unexpected large drops in your household income?”

Coding: =1 if yes, =0 if no.

Expense Increase “In the past year, have there been any unexpected large expenses?”

Coding: =1 if yes, =0 if no.

Drop or Increase Coding: =1 if either Income Drop or Increase Expense =1, =0 otherwise.

Occupational Categories “Which of these best describes your main activity: with pre-coded responses given as “wage/salary work; casual labor; agricultural self-employment; non-agricultural self-employment business owner; government work; member of Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army; cash-for-work; student; jobless; housewife.”¹³⁵ *Coding:* occupational categories per Table 16.

A.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Pro-redistribution	2,904	0.572	0.495	0	1
IED	2,845	0.959	0.199	0	1
Info Share	2,801	0.961	0.193	0	1
Friend Arrest	2,904	0.924	0.266	0	1
Government Delivers	2,874	0.884	0.320	0	1
Electricity	2,904	0.722	0.448	0	1
MP Qawm	2,714	0.197	0.398	0	1
Qawm Candidate	2,554	0.147	0.354	0	1
MP Misuse	2,818	0.471	0.499	0	1
Central Misuse	2,851	0.639	0.480	0	1
Pay Tax	2,904	0.404	0.491	0	1
QVC	2,904	0.319	0.466	0	1
Risk	2,904	0.575	0.494	0	1
Education	2,904	0.680	0.467	0	1
Female	2,904	0.500	0.500	0	1
Pashtun	2,904	0.324	0.468	0	1
Kabul	2,904	0.127	0.333	0	1
Big City	2,904	0.342	0.475	0	1

¹³⁵We combine “cash-for-work” with “casual labor” under the variable *Casual Labor*.

A.4 Alternative Model Specification: Linear Probability Models

Table 5: Effects of Perceptions of Legitimacy on Redistributive Preferences (linear probability)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
IED	0.084 [†] (0.050)				
Info Share		0.103* (0.051)			
Friend Arrest			0.116* (0.046)		
Government Delivers				0.059 [†] (0.032)	
Electricity					0.024 (0.023)
Education	-0.037 [†] (0.022)	-0.038 [†] (0.022)	-0.040 [†] (0.022)	-0.037 [†] (0.022)	-0.039 (0.022)
Female	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.021)
Pashtun	0.115*** (0.024)	0.119*** (0.025)	0.113*** (0.024)	0.112*** (0.024)	0.112 (0.024)
Kabul	-0.160*** (0.038)	-0.158*** (0.038)	-0.145*** (0.037)	-0.162*** (0.037)	-0.154 (0.038)
Constant	0.503*** (0.054)	0.487*** (0.055)	0.482*** (0.051)	0.535*** (0.038)	0.575 (0.030)
R ²	0.027	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.024
N	2845	2801	2904	2874	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Linear probability estimates on preferences for redistribution with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 6: Effects of Political Inclusion on Redistributive Preferences (linear probability)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
MP Qawm	-0.092*** (0.027)			
Qawm Candidate		-0.049* (0.024)		
MP Misuse			0.038† (0.021)	
Central Misuse				0.050* (0.022)
Education	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.022)	-0.031 (0.022)
Female	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.021)
Pashtun	0.099*** (0.025)	0.098*** (0.025)	0.110*** (0.024)	0.108*** (0.024)
Kabul	-0.172*** (0.037)	-0.176*** (0.037)	-0.160*** (0.038)	-0.157*** (0.037)
Constant	0.598*** (0.027)	0.589*** (0.027)	0.559*** (0.029)	0.552*** (0.030)
R ²	0.028	0.025	0.026	0.027
N	2714	2704	2818	2851

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Linear probability estimates on preferences for redistribution with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 7: Quasi-Voluntary Compliance and Risk (linear probability)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Pay Tax	-0.062** (0.023)		
QVC		0.065** (0.024)	
Risk			0.011** (0.004)
Education	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.035 (0.021)	-0.040† (0.021)
Female	-0.023 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.021)
Pashtun	0.112*** (0.024)	0.110*** (0.024)	0.092*** (0.024)
Kabul	-0.151*** (0.037)	-0.145*** (0.037)	-0.150*** (0.037)
Constant	0.612*** (0.028)	0.568*** (0.026)	0.573*** (0.027)
R ²	0.027	0.027	0.026
Num. obs.	2904	2904	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Linear probability estimates on preferences for redistribution with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

A.5 Province-Level Fixed Effects

Table 8: Effects of Perception of Legitimacy on Redistributive Preferences (with province fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
IED	0.073 (0.05)				
Info Share		0.096* (0.05)			
Friend Arrest			0.104 (0.07)		
Government Delivers				0.049 (0.05)	
Electricity					0.028 (0.03)
Education	-0.033 (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.036 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.02)	-0.035 (0.02)
Female	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.023 (0.04)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.019 (0.04)
Pashtun	0.038 (0.04)	0.044 (0.04)	0.040 (0.04)	0.033 (0.05)	0.038 (0.04)
Constant	0.517*** (0.06)	0.495*** (0.05)	0.495*** (0.08)	0.546*** (0.06)	0.573*** (0.05)
N	2845	2801	2904	2874	2904
R^2	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.002

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Estimates on preferences for redistribution with province fixed effects and standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 9: Effects of Political Inclusion on Redistributive Preferences (with province fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
MP Qawm	-0.070* (0.03)			
Qawm Candidate		-0.043 (0.04)		
MP Misuse			0.031 (0.03)	
Central Misuse				0.050 (0.03)
Education	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.023 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.02)
Female	-0.023 (0.04)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.014 (0.04)	-0.016 (0.04)
Pashtun	0.019 (0.05)	0.021 (0.05)	0.030 (0.04)	0.029 (0.05)
Constant	0.596*** (0.04)	0.588*** (0.03)	0.569*** (0.05)	0.557*** (0.05)
N	2714	2554	2818	2851
R ²	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.004

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Estimates on preferences for redistribution with province fixed effects and standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 10: Quasi-Voluntary Compliance and Risk (with province fixed effects)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Pay Tax	-0.073† (0.04)		
QVC		0.059 (0.04)	
Risk			0.010 (0.01)
Education	-0.025 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.02)	-0.036 (0.02)
Female	-0.023 (0.04)	-0.021 (0.04)	-0.016 (0.04)
Pashtun	0.037 (0.04)	0.038 (0.04)	0.034 (0.04)
Constant	0.618*** (0.04)	0.571*** (0.04)	0.573*** (0.05)
N	2904	2904	2904
R ²	0.007	0.005	0.004

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Estimates on preferences for redistribution with province fixed effects and standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

A.6 Selection Effects

We also interrogate possible selection effects if, for example, Afghans who were more likely to favor redistribution self-selected to move to the provincial capitals where we sampled our survey. Given our sample bias towards denser population areas, perhaps our results are driven by a latent factor that both encourages selection into provincial cities and also redistribution. Our significant, and negative, effects on the control for *Kabul* residence above suggest that residents of the capital city, where the state is strongest, are significantly less like to appear pro-distribution. While the excluded category for Kabul are respondents from any of the other sampled cities and towns, the variable could be picking up a largely urban effect. While our survey was not enumerated in truly rural areas, we therefore exploit variation in “big cities” in our samples separate from the capital city and smaller towns, that include the large regional centers of Mazar-i-Shariff (North), Herat (West), Kandahar (South), and Jalalabad (East). These regional seats are not only large in population, but important points of ISAF’s regional command and the government’s counter-insurgency operations, and contain large ANSF bases for security. Therefore, insofar as selection bias may endogenously drive pro or anti-redistribution people towards urban centers in regional capitals, such a pattern should be revealed from people residing in these big cities. Discuss results first and also mention results not shown with Kabul and big city. Figure out how to phrase this section per LGBT.

A.7 Confirmatory Tests on Observables: Effects of Income and Occupational Categories on Preferences

We perform a series of confirmatory tests on observables that prior literature suggests should drive preferences for redistribution based on respondents’ socio-demographic profile in developing countries (see 14. Table 15 examines the effects of income and Table 16 looks at the effects of occupational categories. If these tests replicate results from other contexts, they help to confirm that the factors we employ as explanatory variables gain purchase because they are not them simply artifacts of correlates with or endogenous measures of these other factors, and they confirm that while Afghanistan is unique given its institutional characteristics and weak state performance, our results are in line with the profile of similar citizens in other developing countries.

Table 15 first examines the effects of income. Income is notoriously hard to measure in developing countries, therefore we exploit responses from three questions. To directly measure income, we asked respondents to give their average monthly household income and take the log of their verbatim response in *Income (ln)* (reported in *afghanis*, the national currency). Given the challenges asking about income and the fact that it may not be absolute level of income that matters per se but rather a respondent’s current financial position relative to where they were recently, we asked two additional income questions related to recent income shocks. First, we ask respondents if have experienced any unexpected drops in income in the last year (*Income Drop*), or unexpected expenses (*Increase Expense*), which both =1 if true and =0 if not. We test these variables separately, and then combine

a yes answer =1 for either income drop or increase expense to create *Drop or Increase*, =0 otherwise. Table 16 tests the effects of occupation, dummifying out occupational categories from a question asking respondents to list their occupation (which could include “jobless” and “housewife”).¹³⁶

Table 14: Income and Occupational Categories, Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (ln)	2,904	8.135	1.956	4.585	11.290
Drop Income	2,855	0.237	0.425	0	1
Expense	2,857	0.277	0.448	0	1
Drop or Expense	2,904	0.364	0.481	0	1
Wage Salary	2,904	0.085	0.279	0	1
Casual Labor	2,904	0.208	0.406	0	1
Agriculture	2,904	0.053	0.225	0	1
Businessowner	2,904	0.055	0.229	0	1
Government work	2,904	0.145	0.352	0	1
Police	2,904	0.014	0.117	0	1
Student	2,904	0.074	0.262	0	1
Jobless	2,904	0.059	0.235	0	1
Housewife	2,904	0.307	0.461	0	1

Table 15: Effects of Income on Redistributive Preferences

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Income (ln)	-0.03*** (0.01)			
Drop Income		0.08** (0.03)		
Expense			0.03 (0.02)	
Drop or Expense				0.04† (0.02)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)
Female	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Num. obs.	2904	2855	2857	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

¹³⁶The control for Kabul residence had to be dropped given collinearity given that nearly all government workers reside in Kabul.

Table 11: Effects of Perceptions of Legitimacy on Redistributive Preferences (controlling for big city selection)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
IED	0.09 [†] (0.05)				
Infoshareasf		0.10* (0.05)			
Friendarrest			0.12* (0.05)		
Government Delivers				0.06 [†] (0.03)	
Electricity					0.02 (0.02)
Education	-0.04 [†] (0.02)	-0.04 [†] (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04 [†] (0.02)	-0.04 [†] (0.02)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Big City	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Num. obs.	2845	2801	2904	2874	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 12: Effects of Political Inclusion on Redistributive Preferences (controlling for big city selection)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
MP Qawm	-0.09*** (0.03)			
Qawm Candidate		-0.10** (0.03)		
MP Misuse			0.04† (0.02)	
Central Misuse				0.05* (0.02)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Big City	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Num. obs.	2714	2554	2818	2851

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 13: Quasi-Voluntary Compliance and Risk (controlling for big city selection)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Pay Tax	-0.06** (0.02)		
QVC		0.06** (0.02)	
Risk			-0.02 (0.02)
Education	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pashtun	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Kabul	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Big City	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Num. obs.	2904	2904	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) *Notes:* Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

Table 16: Effects of Occupation on Redistributive Preferences

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Wage Salary	0.07* (0.03)									0.04 (0.04)
Casual Labor		-0.06* (0.03)								-0.07† (0.04)
Agriculture			0.04 (0.05)							0.01 (0.06)
Business Owner				0.02 (0.05)						-0.00 (0.06)
Govt Work					-0.06* (0.03)					-0.08† (0.04)
Police						0.28*** (0.06)				0.26*** (0.07)
Student							-0.06 (0.04)			-0.08† (0.04)
Jobless								0.05 (0.04)		0.02 (0.05)
Housewife									0.04 (0.03)	
Education	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04† (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Female	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Pashtun	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
N	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904	2904

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

(a) Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates on preferences for redistribution. Coefficients show marginal effects with standard errors clustered by primary sampling unit (polling station)

A.8 Measurement Bias

We perform a series of robustness checks to alleviate concerns of measurement bias on our core main explanatory variables. First, we address construct validity and reliability. In Table ??, r coefficients between variables that are likely to measure the same sentiment, such as willingness to report on IED or insurgent activity to the government and views of MP and central government misuse of funds, correlate very highly. However, variables that capture different sentiments or perceptions, do not correlate consistently or highly. These results increase our confidence that our main variables reflect measures that have construct validity and reliability. Second, we address whether an unobserved latent factor systematically drives response bias to our core outcome and explanatory variables. For this to be true, the r coefficients between our measures would be consistently high. However, across our measures this is not the case, and therefore suggests that there is not an unobserved spurious factor driving response bias, such as from social desirability, across our main variables of interest.

Table 17: My caption

	Preredistribution	IED	Info Share	Friend Arrest	Govt Delivers	Electricity	MP Qawm	Qawm Candidate	MP Misuse	Central Misuse	Pay Tax	QVC	Risk
Preredistribution	1.00												
IED	0.02	1.00											
Info Share	0.03	1.00	1.00										
Friend Arrest	0.06	0.11	0.11	1.00									
Govt Delivers	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	1.00								
Electricity	-0.02	0.06	0.04	-0.02	0.01	1.00							
MP Qawm	-0.06	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	1.00						
Qawm Candidate	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.49	1.00					
MP Misuse	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.02	1.00				
Central Misuse	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.71	1.00			
Pay Tax	-0.05	0.09	0.08	0.12	-0.01	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.09	0.08	1.00		
QVC	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.56	1.00	
Risk	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.06	-0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.12	0.12	0.08	-0.06	1.00